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 SUMMARY OF ISSUES RAISED 
 
· The Industry Commission draft report on charitable organisations proposes to add a new class of 
donation deductible organisations to Section 78 ITAA.  These organisations are known as 
Community Social Welfare Organisations (CSWO). 
 
· CSWOs are defined as either having a principal common law charitable purpose of `relief of the 
poor' or `other purposes beneficial to the community'. 
 
· CSWOs are to be added to Section 78 ITAA in order to: 
 - save on administrative costs by ATO and CSWOs 
 - eliminate distortions of s78 ITAA specific organisation lists 
 - permit community support for CSWOs for their choice 
 - allow philanthropic trusts wider funding choices. 
 
· This is unlikely to occur as: 
 
 1. The common law definition of charity (to which the CSWO definition is linked) is neither 
concise nor contemporary. 
 
 2. The two CSWO sub-categories of charity do not capture all the organisations proposed by 
the draft report and include many that are unintended and outside the Inquiry's terms of 
reference. 
 
 3. The definitional tax skew of CSWO will lead to a constricted definition of CSWO and a 
further constrained common law definition of charity. 
 
 4. Investment and distributions of public donation funds are constrained compared to PBI's. 
 
 5. The required public fund will create more administrative costs. 
 
 6. Funds cannot be distributed to `beneficiaries'. 
 
 7. Difficult for self help and mutual groups to distribute funds because of a prohibition 
against CSWOs distributing property to shareholders or members. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The draft report of the Industry Commission's charitable organisations inquiry introduces a new term 
for nonprofit organisations delivering human services.1  The new term is "community social welfare 
organisation" or "CSWO".2  The report recommends that tax deductibility of donations3 be extended 
such organisations.  It then hints at making the definition of CSWO a standard criteria for state 
taxation exemptions.4
 
 
This paper examines the definition of the new term community social welfare organisation and charts 
its possible consequences if adopted by the federal government.  The promise of tax deductibility 
status to previously shunned organisations is largely illusory.  The Commission's aim of simplification 
through clarification of the definition is flawed and will not reduce the administration costs for the 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) or organisations.  
 
THE DEFINITION OF COMMUNITY SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANISATIONS 
 
The term `community social welfare organisation' (CSWO) is initially described in the draft report as 
being, "non-profit human welfare".5
 
  The government in its terms of reference to the Industry 
Commission used the term "charitable organisations", but the Commission has decided that such 
organisations are best described as CSWOs. 
The inquiry's original terms of reference define "charitable organisations" to include 
 
 ... non-government establishments, organisations, associations or trusts that are primarily 
established otherwise than for the purpose of profit or benefit to the individual members of 
the organisations, and the principal objects or purposes of which are charitable or 
benevolent, and which provide any of the following: 
                                                     
1  Industry Commission, Charitable Organisations in Australia, An Inquiry into Community Social Welfare 
Organisations, October 1994, Canberra; hereinafter referred to as the "draft report". 
2  Ibid., at p.2. 
3  Section 78, Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. 
4  Draft report at p.257 and draft recommendation 11.6. 
5  Draft report at p.2, Box 1.1. 
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 (i) welfare services, including income support and the provision of clothing, goods and 
food; 
 
 (ii) community services, such as care in people's homes or community centres provided 
to frail older people, younger people with a disability, and those requiring post acute 
or palliative care; 
 
 (iii) accommodation services, such as emergency shelters and hostels, and homes for 
children, frail older people, or people with disabilities; 
 
 (iv) nursing or convalescent homes, drug referral and rehabilitation, and blood 
transfusion services; 
 
 (v) employment and training services for the unemployed and people with disabilities; 
 
 (vi) advocacy, referral, counselling, and legal services; and 
 
 (vii) emergency and development assistance overseas.6
 
 
The terms of reference also sought to include in the definition of charitable organisation any 
businesses owned or peak organisations representing the listed organisations as well as fund raising 
companies.  The draft report does not make it explicit whether these organisations are included within 
its definition of CSWO.  Peak associations are given as an example of a CSWO in the draft report.7
 
  It 
is doubtful whether the draft report intends to include fundraising companies. 
The author commented before the terms of reference were finalised by the Federal Treasurer8 and 
again in response to the Commission's issues paper,9 that the definition of the inquiry's subject matter 
provided "a slippery problem which defies simple analysis".10
 
  That work plainly stated that, 
 ... the restricted definition of charity employed may prove to be a problem if reforms to the 
legal definition of charity are proposed and specifically for any reform of taxation 
                                                     
6  The Terms of Reference issued by the Assistant Treasurer on 16 December, 1993 hereinafter referred to as "terms of 
reference" and reproduced at p.XV of the draft report. 
7  Draft report at p.220 in Figure 11.1. 
8  McGregor-Lowndes, M. & C. McDonald, A Note on the Draft Terms of Reference of the Industry Commission into 
`Charitable Organisations', Working Paper No.40, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of 
Technology, Brisbane, August, 1993. 
9  McDonald, C. & M. McGregor-Lowndes, A Comment on the Industry Commission Issues Paper on Charitable 
Organisations, Working Paper No.41, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of Technology, 
Brisbane, March 1994. 
10  Ibid., at p.10. 
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provisions.11
 
 
Specifically, the failure to tackle the definitional problem from a holistic perspective of all the 
nonprofit sector and without a sustained public debate about contemporary imperatives of a `charity' 
definition was to court failure.12
 
 
Chapter 11 of the draft report which deals with taxation arrangements further defines CSWOs in 
Figure 11.113 and Section 11.4.1.14  It is noted by the draft report that the Income Tax Assessment Act 
(ITAA) uses the common law definition of "charity", especially in section 23(e).15
 
  The legal definition 
of charity is explained in the draft report as having four sub-categories of 
· the relief of poverty; 
· the advancement of education; 
· the advancement of religion; and 
· other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the previous headings.16
 
 
Two of these headings, according to the draft report capture the definition of community social welfare 
organisation, being 
 
· the relief of poverty; and 
· other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the previous headings.17
 
 
The CSWO definition is used to add a new class of donation deductible organisations to Section 78 
ITAA.  The addition is in direct response to the failure of the Public Benevolent Institution (PBI) 
definition to include contemporary notions of nonprofit entities that deserve `exemption' favours of the 
state.18
 
  A PBI has the characteristics of 
· its main or principal object is the relief of poverty, sickness, suffering, distress, misfortune, 
destitution or helplessness; 
 
                                                     
11  `A Note on the Draft Terms of Reference of the Industry Commission into Charitable Organisations', op.cit., at p.17. 
12  `A Comment on the Industry Commission Issues Paper on Charitable Organisations', op.cit., at pp.9-10. 
13  Draft report at p.220. 
14  Draft report at p.227. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. and Lord Macnaghten in Income Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel [1896] AC 531 at p.583. 
17  Draft report, Box 11.1 at p.224. 
18  The definition of PBI is used as a gateway definition for donation deductibility, sales tax exemption, fringe benefits 
tax exemption and some state based tax exemptions. 
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 5 
· is carried on without purpose of private gain for particular persons; 
 
· is established for the benefit of a section or class of the public; 
 
· that relief is available without discrimination to every member of that section of the public 
which the organisation aims to benefit; and 
 
· the aid is given directly to those in need.19
 
 
These characteristics severely limit the number of CSWOs which could qualify for PBI status.  The 
requirements that aid be given directly to clients with an eleemosynary objective established by case 
law produce a restricted definition of PBI.20
 
 
Consequently the draft report found that CSWOs were not competing on a "level playing field" for 
donations using Section 78 deductibility.  This was the result of two factors.  The first was that multi-
service CSWO had advantages over a single service CSWO.21  As long as the principal purpose of a 
multi-service CSWO was an acceptable PBI activity, then donations could be used for its non-PBI 
subsidiary purposes.  CSWOs which were delivering only one service and did not fall within the PBI 
definitional scope were disadvantaged.  The second cause of the uneven playing field was the divide 
between some CSWOs having tax deductibility status and others not having it.22
 
 
This uneven playing field caused less flexibility in the way CSWOs addressed perceived needs, 
particularly in less direct ways such as preventative activities.  The option of non-PBI CSWOs to seek 
an individual listing in section 78 to gain tax deductibility status was also regarded as creating 
"anomalies which continue to distort the flow of resources to various CSWOs."23  Philanthropic trusts 
are also restrained by section 78(5) ITAA to fund only organisations with tax deductibility, further 
distorting the flow of resources to non-PBI CSWOs.24  To cap the whole situation, the draft report 
found that the law and its administration in respect to tax deductibility status for CSWOs was complex 
and administratively costly.25
 
 
The draft report recommends to overcome those problems that all CSWOs falling under the common 
                                                     
19  Taxation Determination No. TD 93/11. 
20  See Perpetual Trustee Company Limited v FCT (1931) 45 CLR 224; Australian Council of Social Services Inc & 
Anor v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (NSW) (1985) 16 ATR 394; 85 at c 4235. 
21  Ibid., at p.236. 
22  Ibid., at p.237. 
23  Ibid., at p.238. 
24  Trusts may fund non-PBI organisations, but may not themselves be classified under section 78(5). 
25  Ibid, at p.238. 
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law sub-categories of relief of poverty or other services beneficial to the community be given tax 
deductibility status.26
 
  The beneficiaries of this recommendation would be 
 those CSWOs that are not providing direct services to those in need.  These groups include 
those involved in advocacy (such as ACOSS and the Council to Homeless Persons), self 
help organisations (such as Parents without Partners), and smaller community groups 
(such as some neighbourhood houses and groups like the Logan Regional Resource 
Centre).  Philanthropic trusts would also benefit as they would have a wider range of 
organisations to which to distribute their funds.27
                                                     
26  Ibid., at p.239. 
 
27  Id. 
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The benefits would be 
 
· saving on administrative costs for both the ATO and CSWOs through use of a simplier status 
criterion; 
· elimination of distortions of the section 78 listing system; 
· community support for CSWOs of their choice; and 
· philanthropic trusts would have a wider range of funding choices.28
 
 
The draft report then sets out the basis for a CSWO gaining donation deductibility status.  Each 
element of the basis will be examined in detail to assess its operational effect and difference to the 
traditional Public Benevolent Institution donation deductibility status. 
 
(a) its principal purpose is charitable (Charitable purpose refers to the characteristics of a 
CSWO from Figure 11.1, that is, an organisation established for the relief of poverty and 
other purposes beneficial to the community other than specifically advancing education 
and religion). 
 
This element initially seems reasonable and smart public policy to attach the definition to a settled 
legal definition of common law charity.  This option was even preferred by the Australian Council of 
Social Service (ACOSS) in its supplementary submission to the Commission on reforming Section 
78.29
 
  However, the common law definition of charity produces some unintended results.  Further, 
there appears to be no notion of "public" or "institution" in this definition.  This has the result of 
including entities that may not have a public aspect and would depart from the general thrust of 
Section 78. 
This element is also claimed by the draft report to reduce administrative costs on the part of the ATO 
and CSWOs as the common law definition of charity will be clearer than the PBI based criteria.  This 
is not so, as the common law definition in Australia is every bit as problematic as the definition of PBI. 
 
What organisations are included in "relief of poverty" and are they different to those already 
included in the definition of PBI? 
 
The phrase "relief of poverty" is derived from the argument of Sir Samuel Romilly when he was 
counsel in the case of Morice v Bishop of Durham30 and is drawn in turn from the preamble to the 
Statute of Elizabeth (1601).31
                                                     
28  Ibid., at p.240. 
  The first limb of the preamble traditionally includes the purposes of 
29  Submission No.442, at p.2. The first option sought to have PBI replaced with the full common law definition of 
charity including religion and education. 
30  (1805) 10 Ves 522. 
31  43 Eliz 1 c 4. 
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"relief of the aged, impotent and poor" which are construed disjunctively.32  Strangely the word 
"impotent" has never been directly defined by the courts in 400 years, but is thought to cover those 
with a permanent or temporary disability.33  The term "aged" once covered disabilities that accompany 
being aged, rather than old age itself.34  Judicial opinion is slowly moving towards "aged" being prima 
facie charitable without the need to show poverty or suffering, unless confined to an undesirable group 
such as the wealthy aged.35
 
 
In this sub-category of charity the meaning of poor is construed as a relative term.36  This requires that 
a person suffers hardship from a reduction in circumstances rather than any notion of a poverty line 
benchmark.  Tudor on Charities gives an example of "school fees of a child who would otherwise have 
to be removed from a particular school because of the premature death of his (sic) father."37
 
  It is not 
clear how a trust of this type fits into the terms of reference or whether the Commision meant to go 
this far. 
The current taxation determination38 of PBI mirrors the substantive cases39 by defining benevolence as 
"the relief of poverty, sickness, suffering, distress, misfortune, destitution or helplessness".  While the 
courts have not boldly stated that PBI "poverty" is the "relative" common law charity term, 
"destitution" is not necessary if one can find some "suffering, distress or misfortune".40
 
 
Relief of poverty sub-category has an unusual attribute in that it is the only section of the definition of 
charity that does not have to be for the benefit of the general public or an appreciable, but 
unascertained and indefinite, portion of it.41
                                                     
32  Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Hospital Association Ltd. v A. G. [1983] Ch 159, although in Pemsel's case Lord 
Macnaghten did not specifically mention the aged or impotent in the relief of poverty, it is still usually dealt with under 
this heading rather than the fourth head of charity. In this particular case it matters not as the fourth head also makes up 
the definition of CSWO. 
  It is permissible to create a trust for poor employees of a 
33  Maurice, S.G., et. al., Tudor on Charities, 7th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1984 at p.16. 
34  The last case indicating the "year" definition of the "aged" was in 1889 when 50 years was regarded as sufficiently 
old.  Re Wall (1889) 42 Ch.D 510.  It is probable that a contemporary court may raise this benchmark given life 
expectancies and retirement ages. 
35  Ford & Lee, op. cit, at p.836-7. 
36  Re Clarke [1923] 2 Ch 407; City of Hawthorn v Victorian Welfare Association [1970] VR 205; Re Gillespie [1965] 
VR 402. 
37  Maurice, S.G, Tudor on Charities, 7th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1984 at p.19. 
38  TD 93/11. 
39  Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v FCT (1931) 45 CLR 224. 
40  Commissioner of Payroll Tax (Vic) v The Carnmillar Institute 92 ATC 4295 at p.4309. 
41  In general any activity seeking to come under one of the heads of charity must be regarded as being for the public 
benefit rather than some specified individual or group of the public. 
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business or association or even poor relations of the donor.42
 
  In other words there may be a personal 
nexus.  Creating a trust with donation tax deductibility for your poor relatives may be an avenue for 
abuse.  Again, it is not clear that this was the Commission's intention. 
The term "public" and "institution" in PBI qualifies benevolence to ensure that only services are 
provided to the general public or an appreciable, but unascertained and indefinite section of it.43  Thus 
the sub-category of relief of poverty is wider than the term PBI in respect of the lack of having to be 
for the public benefit.  The term "institution" constrains the definition of PBI to well within the limits 
of relief of poverty.  The entity trying to establish PBI status must not merely be a funding body 
without some direct service involvement.  The definition of relief of poverty charity sub-category is 
thus wider and would include foundation style trust funds that merely channel funds to other service 
providers.44
 
 
In summary, while the definitions of the charitable sub-category relief of poverty and PBI are fairly 
similar, the charity category is wider in a number of respects.  There will be a number of entities which 
will now have donation deductibility without being a "public institution".  This appears to contradict 
the essence of the terms of reference of the Inquiry which focuses on service delivery organisations 
with a public service interface. 
 
What organisations are included in "other purposes beneficial to the community" and are they 
different to those already included in the definition of PBI? 
 
This charity sub-category does not extend to all purposes beneficial to the community in the 
contemporary use of the phrase.  It means 
 
 beneficial in a way regarded by the law as charitable, that is, within the enumeration of 
objects in, or within the spirit and intendment of, the preamble to the Statute of 
Elizabeth.45
 
 
This has allowed the courts in recent times to stretch the range of activities or purposes that are 
charitable.  For example, the production of law reports of the superior courts in England and Australia 
was declared charitable in the 1970s.46
                                                     
42  Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601; Re Scarisbrick; Cockshott v Public Trustee [1951] Ch 622. 
  The link with the Statute of Elizabeth, 1601 was that the 
provision of court houses was charitable.  Modern needs for operating courts, such as law reporting, 
was also found to be charitable. 
43  Commissioner of Land Tax (N.S.W.) v Joyce [1974] 48 ALJR 432. 
44  MNR v Trusts & Guarantee Co Ltd (1940) AC 138. 
45  Ford, H.A.J. & Lee, W.A., Principles of the Law of Trusts, 2nd edition, The Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 
1990 at p.857. 
46  Incorporated Council of Law Reporting v A-G [1972] Ch 73; Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for the State of 
Queensland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 CLR 659. 
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This sub-category will include objects such as; 
 
· public works such as beautification of towns,47 agricultural showgrounds,48 a music and drama 
hall49, lifeboats,50 fire brigade51 and law report preparation;52
 
 
· relief of rates and taxes,53
 
 for example reduction of the national debt; 
· mental or moral improvement of the community which opens up the definition to purposes such 
as "the study and dissemination of ethical principles and the cultivation of a rational religious 
sentiment";54
 
 
· objects for the preservation and benefit of animals55 and even promoting vegetarianism;56
 
 
· promotion of industry, commerce and art;57
 
 
· promotion of purposes to increase the comfort of domestic servants and their employers;58
 
 
· provision of recreation and leisure facilities;59
 
 
· relief of prisoners, but this may not include the work of an organisation such as Amnesty 
International;60
                                                     
47  Schellenberger v Trustees Executors and Agency Co. Ltd (1952) 86 CLR 454. 
 
48  Brisbane City Council v A-G (Qld) (1978) 52 ALJR 599. 
49  Monds v Stackhouse (1948) 77 CLR 232. 
50  Johnston v Swann (1818) 3 Madd 457. 
51  Re Wokingham Fire Brigade Trusts; Martin v Hawkind [1951] Ch 373. 
52  Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for the State of Queensland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1971) 125 
CLR 659. 
53  Thellusson v Woodford (1798) 4 Ves. 227. 
54  Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565. 
55  National Anti-Vivisection Society v IRC [1948] AC 31. 
56  Re Slatter (1905) 21 TLR 295. 
57  Crystal Palace Trustees v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1951] Ch 132. 
58  (1850) 13 Beav. 87. 
59  Re Hadden [1932] 1 CH 133; but note that this is not as wide a purpose as one may think, IRC v Braddeley [1955] 
AC 447 and statutory provisions have been used to extend the definition in Australian States and UK. 
60  McGovern v A-G [1981] 3 All ER 493, excluded because of political objectives. 
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· the care and upbringing of young people;61
 
 and 
· even promotion of good housewifery.62
 
 
Most of these objects may not come within the general contemporary understanding of community 
social welfare organisations and most also fall outside the specific examples listed in the terms of 
reference.  This sub-category of charity is much wider than the definition of PBI.  For example animal 
charities have been specifically excluded from PBI status, but would certainly be included under this 
sub-category.63
 
  It is difficult to find reasons why the draft report wishes to include all of this sub-
category of charity as community social welfare organisations, given most of its organisations are 
outside the scope of the terms of reference. 
A further point needs to be raised about Figure 11.1 of the draft report and the definition of CSWOs.  
It gives the examples of "self help and peak organisations" as being part of the sub-category "other 
services beneficial to the community".  Lyons also promotes this view which has little or even no basis 
in formal charity law.64  It may be that administrators of legislation have so classified some peak 
organisations, but this has no basis in case law.  Peak associations such as the Councils of Social 
Service and the example of a community group used by the draft report, Logan Regional Resource 
Centre,65 would probably fall within the poverty or education sub-category of charity.66  This is 
provided that they did not fall foul of being a entity for political purposes or advocating a particular 
change in the law.67
 
 
Self help groups would only fall under this category if they were for one of the above objects and did 
not offend the requirement of public benefit through being for mutual benefit.68
                                                     
61  Re Cohen (1919) 39 TLR 16. 
  It is likely that such 
groups would fall within the relief of poverty or education sub-categories.  An example would be a 
group of people, usually parents, formed around a specific medical condition.  Marriage guidance 
62  Re Pleasants (1923) 39 TLR 675. 
63  Re RSPCA Qld Inc 92 ATC 4254, where the RSPCA was denied PBI status. 
64  Lyons, M., Designing and Counting `Charitable Organisation', in Third Sector Welfare:  The Industry Commission's 
Inquiry and the Future of Non-government Organisations, Unija Discussion Paper No.5, ed. R. Melville, Sydney, 1994 
at p.25. 
65  Ibid at p.239. 
66  Kindergarten Union (NSW) Inc v Waverley Municipal Council (1960) 5 LGRA 365. They may also come within the 
relief of poverty classification, there may be problems with establishing a direct enough link between their activities and 
the poor, rather than the general community.  The directness of the link was hinted at in ACOSS v Commissioner of Pay 
Roll Tax (1985) 1 NSWLR 567 at p.571 and p.574. 
67  See the next page for a further discussion of this issue. 
68  Carne v Long (1860) 2 De G F & J 75.  Refer next page for discussion of "mutual benefit". 
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organisations can be classed as preventative and are therefore not PBIs.69
 
  They may still be charitable, 
but again classed under the sub-category education, rather than relief of poverty or other purposes 
beneficial to the community.  By omitting the sub-category of education, a number of CSWOs may be 
seriously disadvantaged. 
Other general limits to the charity definition 
 
In describing the two sub-categories of charity, I have mentioned some overall constraining matters on 
what may be classed as charitable.  It is appropriate to summarise them at this point.  Objects for 
political purposes cannot be accorded the status of a charity.  For example, if Amnesty International 
(Australia) had its principal purpose as  
 
· attempting to secure the release of prisoners of conscience; or 
· to procure the abolition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
 
these would not be charitable as they are political objects and might prejudice Australian relations with 
the foreign country concerned.70  Further recent examples of this charitable constraint on activities are 
the English controversies surrounding War on Want, Oxfam and the Charity Commission's policy 
guideline "Political Activities by Charities".71
 
 
Australian courts have not had the opportunity to clarify the boundaries of political activity for some 
time.72
 
  If the Charity Commission's policy guideline, "Political Activities by Charities" was adopted, 
then COSS's may have to limit their wide ranging political comments to those concerned with relief of 
poverty if classified under the `poor relief head' of charity or avoid what the law classifies as `political 
propaganda' if classified under the `education' head.  For example the Charity Commission guideline 
states 
 Charities ... must avoid:- 
 
 (a) Seeking to influence or remedy those causes of poverty which be in the social, 
economic and political structures of countries and communities, 
 
 (b) Bringing pressure to bear on a government to procure a change in policies or 
administrative practices, (for example, on land reform, the recognition of local trade 
unions, human rights, etc.) 
 
                                                     
69  Marriage Guidance Council of Victoria v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vict.) 90 ATC 4770. 
70  McGovern v A-G [1981] 3 All ER 493. 
71  Charity Commission, Political Activities by Charities, Policy Guide CC9, London, undated. 
72  Bacon v Pianta (1966) 114 CLR 634. 
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 (c) Seeking to eliminate social, economic, political or other injustice.73
 
 
In the case of educational charities the Charity Commission gives the example of unacceptable 
political activity as, 
 
 the distribution of literature urging the Government to take a particular course, or urging 
sympathisers to apply pressure to Members of Parliament for that purpose, would not be 
education in the charitable sense.74
 
 
It is submitted that this interpretation would imperil the activities of a majority of Australian peak 
associations, advocacy groups and even traditional charities from time to time. 
 
Further, an object to reform a particular law is regarded as a political activity and not charitable.75  
"Self help" trusts also face problems particularly where there is a hint of a mutual society.76
 
  It is these 
types of organisations that the draft reports considers should be included in the definition of CSWO, 
but they are on the border of the definition of charity itself. 
Administrative Efficiencies 
 
It is unlikely that any administrative efficiencies will result from the present proposal as suggested in 
the draft report.  The assumption of the draft paper is that the two sub-categories of the definition of 
common law charity is "a simpler criterion for deciding deductibility status."77
 
  This is not the case.  In 
fact the complete opposite may result from the policy. 
The charity boundary is characterised by fuzzy borders caused by strained legal logic, perverted and 
competing public policy demands, historical misappropriation and inconsistent legislative intervention. 
 It has given commentators material on which to launch a tirade of comment on the injustice and 
economic inefficiency of inappropriate boundaries of charity.78
                                                     
73  Charity Commission, Political Activities by Charities, Pamphlett CC9, London, undated at p.9. 
 
74  Id. 
75  Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] Ac 406. 
76  Carne v Long (1860) 2 De G.F. & J. 75; Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust Housing Association Ltd v A-G (1926) 
136 LT 60. 
77  Draft report at p.240. 
78  For example, G.W. Keeton, `The Charity Muddle', Current Legal Problems, Stevens & Sons, 1949, pp.86-102; G.W. 
Keeton, `Judicial Failure in Charities', in English Law - The Judicial Contribution, eds. David & Charles, Newton 
Abbot, 1974, pp.150-170; J.C. Brady, `The Law of Charity and Judicial Responsiveness to Changing Social Need', 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol.27, No.3, 1976, pp.198-215; N. Bentwich, `The Wilderness of Legal Charity', 
The Law Quarterly Review, Vol.49, 1933, pp.520-527; K. Tokeley, `A New Definition for Charity?', Victoria University 
Wellington Law Review, Vol.21, 1991, pp.41-58; J. Hackney, `The Politics of Chancery', Current Legal Problems, 
1981, pp.113-131; S. Bright, `Charity and Trusts for the Public Benefit-Time for a Re-Think', The Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer, Vol.53, 1989, pp.28-41; H. Cohen, `Charities - A Utilitarian Perspective', Current Legal Problems, 
1989, pp.241-258. 
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A measure of the seriousness of this issue is the sustained remarks of normally conservative judges 
from Anglo-Australian jurisdictions about the inadequacy of the definitional boundary.  The often 
repeated quote of Lord Sterndale M.R. is representative of other judicial comments, 
 
 I am unable to find any principle which will guide one easily, and safely, through the 
tangle of the cases as to what is and what is not a charitable gift...  The whole subject is in 
an artificial atmosphere altogether.  A large number of gifts are held charitable in the 
ordinary acception of the term, and when one takes gifts which have been held to be 
charitable, and compares them with gifts which have been held out not to be charitable, it 
is very difficult to see what the principles is on which the distinction rests."79
 
 
A leading charity text author, further observes, 
 
 Almost any proposition for which there is authority can be authoritatively refuted.  Only a 
very rash person would care to forecast the result of charity litigation.  All the prudent can 
do is to grope intelligently.  And it is necessary to do some groping, for momentous 
consequences hang on the issue of charity.80
and 
 
 Anyone who thinks he can confidently proclaim general principles relating to charities is 
either an ignoramus or a genius.81
 
 
An international charity law practitioner observed that 
 
 Pemsel's articulation of allowable charitable purpose have been interpreted in so erratic a 
manner that one must be schooled in arcane and esoteric legal trivia to determine what is 
charitable at law.82
 
 
The common law definition of charity requires updating to ensure that it reflects broad community 
consensus about the boundaries of the definition.  The theory simply stated is that the common law 
through the precedent of cases can adjust the definition of charity to account for new contexts, 
technologies and changing social conditions.  If this were the case then perhaps linking the definition 
of CSWOs to the common law definition of charity may be appropriate. 
 
However, the common law in Australia is not adequately performing the task of updating the 
                                                     
79  In Re Tetley [1923] 1 Ch. 258 at 266. 
80  L.A. Sheridan, `Nature of Charity', The Malayan Law Journal, 1957, pplxxxvi-xcix at lxxxvi. 
81  Ibid., p.lxxxviii. 
82  Bromley, E.B., Quest for Convergence: Musings from the Middle of the Maze, a conference paper presented at 
NCVO International Charity Law Conference, London, September, 1994. 
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definition of charity.  One may point to England and Wales where most of their CSWOs are charitable 
and changing conditions are accommodated, albeit slowly.  The situation in England and Wales is 
markedly different to Australia as it has an independent quasi-judicial body known as the Charity 
Commission.  This Commission provides administrative rulings on a case by case basis and is now 
formulating more broadly based policies on the definition of charity.  The result is that the judiciary is 
not relied on to be the sole institution to facilitate the changes to the legal definition of charity.  The 
Industry Commission's draft report specifically rejects the establishment of a body similar to the 
Charity Commission in Australia.83
 
  It favours greater inter-governmental co-operation. 
An example of the Charity Commission trying to administratively move the definition of charity is 
their guidance policy on charities established for relief of the poor.84
                                                     
83  Draft report at p.179. 
  As mentioned above the 
common law as it currently stands measures poverty relative to an individual's background and 
standard of life to which he/she has been accustomed.  The policy guide seeks to formulate a modern 
definition of poverty as being 
84  Charity Commission, Charities for the Relief of the Poor, Policy Document CC4. 
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 Generally speaking, anyone who cannot afford the normal things in life which most people 
take for granted would qualify for help.85
 
 
Australia does not have an equivalent structure acting to advance such reform by administrative 
regulation and edict.  One may propose that the ATO could be that institution, as implied by the 
Industry Commission and this proposal will be returned to shortly. 
 
The Australian common law is faltering in modernising the definition of charity for a number of 
reasons.  First, the common law of charity is "the product of homogeneous societies with commonly 
religiously based values".86
 
  Our Australian society is no longer homogeneous and the definition of 
charity must respond to changing public values and policy. Principals of divine rights articulated in 
one religious tradition no longer serve contemporary society. 
Second, the expense of court proceedings has meant that few nonprofit organisations are prepared to 
expend vast amounts of valuable resources going to the superior courts to clarify the definition of 
charity.  The paper entitled "Inquiries, Empirical Research and Regulatory Failure" by the author 
chronicles the increasing inaccessibility of the courts since the fifteenth century due to cost, delay, 
technical complexities and inappropriate remedies.87
 
  This still exists today with cost deterring even 
the wealthy from embarking on legal action.  Cairns notes of the English jurisdiction, 
 The great expense of an application to the Court deters most organisations from appealing 
against the Commissioners refusal to register it as a charity and there have been few such 
cases since the Charities Act was passed.88
 
 
A recent Victorian inquiry on charities notes the evidence of senior counsel that, 
                                                     
85  Ibid., at p.3. 
86  Bromley, op. cit., at p.2. 
87  M.McGregor-Lowndes, Inquiries, Empirical Research and Regulatory Failure, Working Paper No.31, Program on 
Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of Technology, 1992. 
88  E. Cairns, op. cit., at p.52. 
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 Cost is one of the most serious aspects of the charitable trusts jurisdiction and the equity 
jurisdiction; there is no question about that.89
 
  
The number of superior court cases about the definition of charity in Australia from 1975-1990 bears 
this point out. 
 
Reported Australian Cases 1975-1990 
Definition of Charity 
 
Head of Definition Number of Cases Decided in favour of 
Organisation 
Relief of Poverty 2 1 
Education 6 4 
Religion 4 4 
Public Benefit 7 3 
Total 19 12 
 
 
As the draft report itself points out, the majority of CSWOs who will benefit from the alteration are 
small organisations.  These are the very organisations that will be restrained by legal costs from 
pursuing the widening of the definition of CSWO in the superior courts.  A similar level of legal 
expense exists in England and Wales, but the quasi-judicial function of the Charity Commission tends 
to mitigate the situation.  The majority of litigation occurs because government departments (usually 
the revenue authorities) bring actions against nonprofit organisations.  They appeal to constrict the 
definition, rarely to expand it.  This leads to the next issue. 
 
Third, deciding the definition of charity in a taxation context tends to distort the definition of charity 
further because of the style of judicial interpretation involved.  The judicial approach to interpreting 
the meanings of an Act will differ appreciably between a taxing statute, a beneficial statute and a 
statute which grants exemptions to charity.90
 
  Cross from an English perspective notes that, 
 the arguments of the Revenue authorities, on the one hand, tend to be listened to with 
more sympathy, and in any case they are prepared if necessary, to carry their cases to 
appeal.  It is noteworthy that most of the recent decisions in the higher courts limiting the 
                                                     
89  Victoria, Victorian Legal and Constitutional Committee, `A Report to Parliament on The Law Relating to Charitable 
Trusts', Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 1989, at p.59 
90  Chesterman, M., Charity, Trusts and Social Welfare, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979, at pp.132-133; 
Professor Pearce notes the case of State Transport Authority v Adelaide Corp. (1980) 24 SASR 481 where at 484 Wells 
J. said in relation to the judicial interpretation of taxing statutes that, "In cases of doubt, a court should not be astute to 
enlarge the purview of the exemption where there is a real possibility that the enlargement will ultimately increase the 
burden upon the very much wider segment of the community who must pay the tax." D.C. Pearce & R.S. Geddes, 
Statutory Interpretation in Australia, 3rd ed., Butterworths, Sydney, 1988. 
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scope of charity have been in revenue cases.91
 
 
This may not be a problem if the definition of charity was only of relevance in revenue statutes, but the 
term has considerable legal relevance outside tax law.  It performs the following important functions at 
common law 
 
· sets the threshold definition for the creation of a charitable trust; and 
· sets the test of validity for a bequest to "purposes" rather than "persons" in a will; 
 
and in statutory instruments there 
 
· are over seventy Federal Acts which define or import a definition of the concept of charity.  
Such Commonwealth Acts use the definition in diverse contexts including child care,92 
copyright,93 sex and race discrimination,94 air navigation,95 broadcasting and television,96 
occupational superannuation,97 and foreign takeovers;98
 
 and 
· there are hundreds of State Acts which define or import a definition of the concept of charity, 
which are not necessarily taxation statutes.99
 
 
The use is substantial in areas other than taxation law and despite the draft report's comment that, `the 
term charitable organisation is relevant to tax law but has little applicability outside this area...'.100  The 
draft report itself impliedly acknowledges this point in the context of fundraising legislation.101
 
 
The location of the cases concerning the definition of charity in revenue statutes will tend to constrict 
                                                     
91  G. Cross, `Some Recent Developments in the Law of Charity', Law Quarterly Review, Vol.72, 1956, pp.187-208, at 
pp.204-5. 
92  Section 4B, Child Care Act 1972 (Cth). 
93  Section 106(1), Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
94  Sections 23, 36, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
95  Regulation 3, Air Navigation [Charges] Regulations 1985 (Cth). 
96  Regulation 8, Broadcasting and Television Regulations 1966 (Cth). 
97  Regulation 15, Occupational Superannuation Standards Regulation 1987 (Cth). 
98  Regulation 2, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth). 
99  The survey of Commonwealth Acts was possible by the electronic search of the legislation for the occurrence of the 
definition of charity, charities and charitable.  State legislation on such electronic retrieval process indicates that the 
definition is used in New South Wales over three hundred times and Victoria in over two hundred instances. 
100  Draft Report, Box 1.1 at p.2. 
101  Draft report at p.199. 
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its meaning as it has clearly done with the meaning of PBI.  One can hardly blame the judiciary for 
failing to widen the meaning of the term PBI when its introduction was explicitly stated "to prevent a 
considerable loss of revenue."102
 
 
A recent English matter illustrates the variation of outlooks.103
 
  A charitable trust was established to 
provide interest free or low interest loans to poor people to enable them to buy their own homes.  The 
IRC objected to the registration of the trust by the Charity Commission on several grounds, but mainly 
because to help poor people buy homes was not commensurate with their need and the beneficiaries 
might derive a profit at the expense of the charity.  The Charity Commission took a different view 
given the 
                                                     
102  Dr Earle Page, Treasurer, on the first reading of the amendment bill, Hansard, 11 September, 1928 at p.6565. 
Initially the term "charity" in an Australian Federal taxation statute was judicially interpreted narrowly as "relief of the 
poor", rather than in the full common law sense of the four heads of charity. Chesterman v FCT (1923) 32 CLR 362 
where the Australian High Court defined "charity" in the sense of "relief to the poor" and was overturned on appeal to 
the Privy Council, [1926] AC 128.   
103  Charity Commissioner's Annual Report for 1990, at p.28. 
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 growing number of charities which now undertake functions relating to the care of the 
disadvantaged in the community which in recent history have been carried out by local 
authorities.104
 
 
The Charity Commission were able to come to a sensible set of guidelines to permit the charitable 
work to prosper, which is their mission, rather than to run an efficient and tidy tax collection 
service.105
 
 
The lack of judicial input to the definition of charity will result in the ATO playing an even greater role 
in the administrative formulation of the definition of charity.  It is of note that the Charity Commission 
in England and Wales is an quasi-judicial body largely independent of political imperatives, something 
which cannot be said of the ATO.  The assurance of non-interference by political pressures may well 
be important if the definition of charity is to be extended to organisations that may be characterised as 
advocacy, preventative or peak associations for CSWOs.  Those who may argue that the political 
pressures in this area are trivial just have to review the list of specific PBI organisations and how they 
obtained that status, as acknowledged in the draft report.106
 
 
In summary, the use of two sub-categories of charity to achieve the object of permitting nonprofit 
human service organisations to compete for Section 78 status on a level playing field is substantially 
flawed.  It is flawed in that 
 
· the two sub-categories of charities do not capture all the organisations proposed by the draft 
report and include many that are not within the general thrust of Section 78 or the terms of 
reference; 
 
· the definition of charity is not clear and will cause the ATO and CSWOs considerable 
administration costs; and 
 
· the tax skew that could be given to the interpretation of charity will adversely affect the meaning 
of charity for CSWO and in other legislative and common law contexts. 
 
                                                     
104  Ibid., at p.8. 
105   Having personally acted for a number of Federally assisted housing co-operatives trying to secure not PBI status but 
Section 23(e) income tax exempt status under the head of common law charity, I experienced the ATO using similar 
arguments to those of the IRC.  It was a most frustrating experience given the innovative schemes to alleviate inner city 
poverty contributed to by high housing rentals. Over a decade later, these organisations have proved their social worth to 
the Brisbane community. 
106  Draft report at p.238. 
(b) it does not pay any of its profits or financial surplus, or give any of its property to 
shareholders, members, beneficiaries, controllers or owners, as the case requires. 
 
 Working Paper No. PONC45 - QUT 
 
 21 
The second element again appears initially to be sensible.  It is a restatement of what Professor Henry 
Hansmann described as the "non-distribution constraint" which is the definitional hallmark of all 
nonprofit entities.107  This is also reflected in the terms of reference where it describes the 
organisations which are the subject of the inquiry as those "primarily established otherwise than for the 
purpose of profit or benefit to the individual members of the organisation."108
 
  The use of the word 
"beneficiaries" in this element is puzzling from either a legal or contemporary language perspective.  
Beneficiaries in either context are simply those who are the only focus for the disbursement of the 
property and services of a charitable trust.  The inclusion of the word makes a nonsense of the whole 
thrust of the proposal. 
There is also the issue of self-help CSWOs who also may be caught because their members are 
"shareholders" or "members" of an incorporated or unincorporated association.  The definition requires 
further sophistication if these types of organisations are to be able to even play on the field for tax 
deductible donations. 
 
The public fund: 
 
(c) it has a public fund; 
 (i) to which gifts of money or property for its charitable purpose or purposes are to be 
made; 
 (ii) to which any interest on money in the fund is to be credited; 
 (iii) to which any money derived from the property given to the fund is to be paid; 
 (iv) that does not receive any other money or property; and 
 (v) that is used only to support the organisation's charitable purpose or purposes; 
 
(d) it has agreed to provide, for the public record, statistical data about gifts to that 
organisation during a specified period; and 
 
(e) it complies with any rules made from time to time by the Treasurer or by another relevant 
ministers to ensure that gifts to that organisation are used only to support its charitable 
purpose or purposes. 
 
The draft paper proposes that a public fund would be established by each qualifying CSWO for the 
receipt and management of deductible gifts.109
                                                     
107  H.B. Hansmann, `The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise', The Yale Law Journal, Vol.89, No.5, 1980, pp.835-898 at 
p.835; H.B. Hansmann, `Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.129, 
No.3, 1981, pp.497-623 at p.500 
  The use of such funds would only be for the "support 
108  Terms of Reference at clause 2(a). 
109  Op. cit., p.241. 
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of the organisation's charitable purpose or purposes".110  Although not specifically stated, it is probable 
that this fund would be a charitable trust with the organisation as the charitable trustee.  This may 
mean a substantial alteration in operations for PBI organisations.  This style of arrangement is already 
in place for some section 78 organisations such as medical research, building funds and overseas aid 
gifts.111
 
 
If the fund is in fact to be a charitable trust, then the common law and various state statutes relating to 
charitable trusts will apply to the trust funds.  Presently most donations (unless subject to their own 
charitable trust) are received by the organisations for use according to the directions of the 
organisation's management in accordance with the objects of the association.  Under the new 
conditions, the deductible donations may be used only for the organisations's charitable purpose.  It is 
not clear whether this is to be restricted, 
 
· post to the principal purpose which is CSWO charitable (ie, restricted to two heads of the 
common law charity definition); 
 
· for other charitable objects of the organisation; or 
 
· of for non-charitable purposes.  The clarification of this point would be an important issue for 
the final report of the Industry Commission. 
 
An example will assist in teasing out the differences referred to in the above paragraph.  Take the 
example of an organisation formed for the principal purpose of delivering cups of soup to the poor of 
Brisbane which may be charitable.  It would qualify for PBI status now and also the draft paper's 
CSWO.  A deductible donation may not be able to be used the same way if one was a PBI and the 
other was a CSWO.  A consequence is that the playing field is still not level for non-PBI organisations. 
 
(A) Present PBI Case 
 
A deductible donation at present could be banked to an account in the name of the organisation and 
mixed with its general funds.  It could be invested in a high yielding but risky securities for a week.  It 
might then be used to pay the wages in a commercial business the organisation owns as an 
investment.112
 
  Another use of the funds may be to provide a preventative service (not within the PBI 
definition) which is quite minor in regard to its principal purpose.  The organisation could also expend 
the gift on a one off political campaign against a government proposed Industry Commission inquiry. 
                                                     
110  Id. 
111  TR94/D34 
112  The profits of the business are used solely for the purpose of providing cups of soup to Brisbane's poor. 
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(B) Proposed CSWO Case 
 
A deductible donation would have to be banked not to the organisation's general account, but to an 
account of which it was the trustee.  Various Trusts Acts in each Australian State and Territory 
together with common law of trusts would regulate the conduct of that account.  The investment of 
such trust monies permitted in some States is quite restrictive and lead one prominent text to comment, 
 
 The statutory lists and supplementary investment powers given to trustees by statute 
enshrine a policy respecting the investment of trust funds which is largely irrelevant to the 
needs of many trusts.113
 
 
The trustee is also under a duty to use the funds only for the purposes of the charitable trust.  This 
means that such charitable trust funds can only be used for the specific charitable purpose or purposes 
of the trust, and not for some other ancillary activity of the organisation. 
 
If only the principal charitable purpose can be funded from donations, then funds could only be used 
to fund the provision of cups of soup, not to assist in some other activity that may benefit a subsidiary 
charitable purpose.  The boundary of what is for the principal charitable purpose of the organisation as 
distinct from purposes that may be permissible under an organisation's other objects is a matter which 
is difficult to ascertain and requiring constant monitoring.  This would also be the case if the CSWO 
could apply the funds not just to its principal purpose, but to other subsidiary charitable purposes.  This 
is because the line between charitable purposes and non-charitable purposes can be fuzzy.  A breach 
by the trustee (probably the organisation) may make the trustee liable to replace the money in the trust 
fund, if the money was not recoverable because it had been expended in service provision.  This 
introduces a significant new liability for CSWOs as well as administrative costs. 
 
These examples give an indication that a further layer of administration in complying with trust 
legislation and common law will be imposed on Section 78 CSWOs.  Another possible source of 
administrative requirements is contained in the clause (e) of the proposed characteristics where the 
Treasurer could impose regulations to ensure the fidelity of the charitable trust fund, recording of 
statistical data and the need for enhanced accounting procedures.  Again this will increase 
administration costs rather than decrease costs for both the ATO and CSWO. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Industry Commission's new term "community social welfare organisation" fits easily into the 
welfare sector's discourse.  It attempts to leave behind the historical baggage accompanying terms such 
as "institution", "charity" or "benevolence".  It seeks to provide a cost effective definition of a CSWO 
to produce a level playing field for nonprofit human welfare organisations that has previously been the 
                                                     
113  Ford & Lee, op. cit. at p.478. 
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cause of injustice. 
 
The operationalisation of the term by linking it directly to part of the unreformed and largely stagnant 
common law definition of charity will not achieve the level playing field of tax deductibility status for 
all CSWOs.  The sub-categories of charity do not include many of the organisations the Commission 
nominates for the definition of CSWO and includes many organisations outside the scope of the 
inquiry's terms of reference. 
 
The Australian Taxation office, tax tribunals and the judiciary through revenue cases are inappropriate 
institutions to facilitate the development of a generic definition of community social welfare 
organisation.  The revenue based interpretations of a CSWO will eventually  restrict its definition.  
There is the possibility of further constriction of the common law definition of charity which plays an 
important role outside the taxation arena.  The proposed definition of community social welfare 
organisation will not provide a touchstone to simplify administration costs or increase donations which 
is so desperately required for the facilitation of human welfare services in Australia. 
